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People often feel like their minds and their bodies are in different places. Far from
an exotic experience, this phenomenon seems to be a ubiquitous facet of human
life (e.g., Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). Many times, people’s minds seem to go
“somewhere else”—attention becomes disconnected from perception, and people’s
minds wander to times and places removed from the current environment (e.g., Schooler
et al., 2004). At other times, however, people’s minds may seem to go nowhere at
all—they simply disappear. This mental state—mind-blanking—may represent an extreme
decoupling of perception and attention, one in which attention fails to bring any stimuli into
conscious awareness. In the present research, we outline the properties of mind-blanking,
differentiating this mental state from other mental states in terms of phenomenological
experience, behavioral outcomes, and underlying cognitive processes. Seven experiments
suggest that when the mind seems to disappear, there are times when we have simply
failed to monitor its whereabouts—and there are times when it is actually gone.
Keywords: consciousness, attention, perception, mind-wandering, mind-blanking, stimulus-independent thought,
task-unrelated thought, reading comprehension
“Where is my mind?” (The Pixies, 1988)
Our minds are magic. Like a prop in an illusionist’s sleight of
hand, they seem to flit from place to place—now here, now there,
now . . .nowhere. Themagic of ourminds is often lost in themun-
dane details of our daily routines, but the remarkable flexibility
of our mental lives remains. Our minds may be directed toward
the task at hand—they may be “here” as we concentrate on our
daily commute or focus on the contents of a meeting or conver-
sation. Our minds may also be “there,” or any place other than
the present situation—they may travel to an upcoming vacation,
a favorite memory, or even a to-do list as the morning commute
turns into a traffic jam or the staff meeting becomes a tedious
exercise in endurance. At other times, our minds may go to a third
place—neither here nor there, but nowhere. There may be times
when our minds are blank.
Mind-blanking—when our minds are seemingly “nowhere”—
is defined by a lack of conscious awareness. During periods of
blankness, the individual is not focally aware of any stimuli,
either internal or external. Although this definition may con-
jure up images of mind-blanking drivers suddenly swerving into
oncoming traffic and joggers dropping to the pavement mid-
stride, research suggests that conscious awareness is unnecessary
for much of human functioning; rather, the vast majority of cog-
nitive processing and behavioral control seems to occur outside of
conscious awareness. Countless stimuli are constantly streaming
in and around every individual, in the form of both environmen-
tal cues and internal trains of thought. Although the majority
of these stimuli never reach conscious awareness, they are still
perceived—and they may still influence emotions, opinions, deci-
sions, and behavior (e.g., Bargh and Chartrand, 1999) and even
lead individuals to form, pursue, and accomplish goals (e.g.,
Bargh et al., 2001).When stimuli fail to reach conscious awareness
and the mind goes blank, the persistence of non-conscious pro-
cesses may allow people to continue carrying out surprisingly
elaborate behaviors, even in the absence of this hallmark of
human experience.
However, some mental operations—such as complex infor-
mation processing, problem solving, and intentional actions—do
seem to require conscious awareness (Dehaene and Naccache,
2001). In order for information to enter conscious awareness, it
must be attended to. Attention seems to select stimuli from the
murky sea of peripherally processed perceptual information and
place it before the spotlight of conscious awareness (e.g., Crick
and Koch, 1990; Posner, 1994); it selects from several simultane-
ous possible streams of thought and presents one to conscious
awareness, excluding all others (e.g., James, 1907; Baars, 1997;
Schooler et al., 2011).
But attention is an unpredictable beast, prone to flights of
fancy. It is not constrained to the task at hand, nor even to the
present moment. Rather than remaining “here,” in the physically
and temporally present perceptual environment, attention—and
the conscious awareness it enables—can decouple from percep-
tion and allow the mind to transcend the here-and-now of the
body’s current surroundings (e.g., Wegner, 1997; Mason et al.,
2007; Schooler et al., 2011). The decoupling of attention and per-
ception allows the mind to wander—to fill consciousness with
ideas related to times unknown, places unseen, and possibilities
previously unimagined (as well as other, more practical mental
contents—such as what kind of bread to pick up on the way home
from work).
Mind-wandering provides evidence that many behaviors can
persist unhindered when attention is turned elsewhere. Research
suggests that people’s minds are separated from their current per-
ceptual environments nearly half the time (Killingsworth and
Gilbert, 2010); the mind seems to flit from thought to thought
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and place to place, stopping in the present environment only
when automatic processing cannot handle the task at hand
(Mason et al., 2007). For much of human life, the mind is not
“here” but “there”—and people do not seem to suffer obvious
behavioral deficits on many tasks when attention is decoupled
from perception.
If people can function adaptively when attention is
elsewhere—when their minds are wandering—then they
should also be able to do so when attention is nowhere—when
their minds are blank. The idea of performing many activities—
particularly well-practiced behaviors such as walking, driving,
and pretending to listen—while attending to something else
seems to be an aspect of everyday life. However, the idea of
attention being not just somewhere else, but nowhere at all, may
not be as intuitive. A blank mind—a mind in which attention
does not call any perceptual input into conscious awareness—
seems to be an enigma, eluding introspective insight. There is
little to imagine about it beforehand (how can one simulate
an absence?), similarly little to remember when it is over (how
can one remember nothing?), and any attempts to analyze the
contents of one’s own blank mind in-the-moment necessarily
interrupt the phenomenon of mind-blanking. Although it may
make logical sense that people can continue functioning in the
absence of conscious awareness, the difficulty of simulating such
a state seems to have pushed the blank mind from the realm of
possibility—or at least from the focus of empirical study.
However, the blank mind occupies a prevalent role in many lay
theories of consciousness. It finds support in the work of William
James (1890), who wrote that consciousness could be experienced
as continuous even if it contained “interruptions, time-gaps dur-
ing which the consciousness went out altogether to come into
existence again at a later moment.” It is often experienced (or
at least pursued) through practices such as meditation (e.g.,
Campion and Rocco, 2009) and hypnosis (e.g., Holroyd, 2003).
And it is the focus of current academic interest, as people trained
to periodically ask themselves “Am I conscious now?” often
begin to doubt the omnipresence of conscious awareness, and
become increasingly less confident that they were conscious in
the moments immediately preceding their introspective inquiry
(Blackmore, 2002).
The blank mind can also be found in empirical studies—
peeking through the cracks of investigations into other ques-
tions related to conscious experience. Many studies of attention
implicitly deny the existence of mind-blanking by constraining
participants such that they cannot report the experience of this
mental state; for example, some studies only allow reports of
being focused, wandering with awareness, or wandering with-
out awareness (e.g., Smallwood et al., 2008; Sayette et al., 2010).
However, reports of mind-blanking have surfaced in studies with
less constrained methodologies. One study on task-unrelated
thought that allowed participants to report their mental con-
tents in their own words found that people described 18% of
task-unrelated mental states as times when they were thinking
of “nothing at all” (Schooler et al., 2004). Another study indi-
cates that mind-blanking represents the second-most common
form of concentration lapses (Watts and Sharrock, 1985). Studies
using descriptive experience sampling, which ping participants
throughout the day for self-described reports of mental contents
(e.g., Hurlburt and Heavey, 2001, 2008), find that people spon-
taneously report acting in the absence of conscious thought or
awareness (“just doing”). Although the experimental design of
many studies has precluded empirical investigations of mind-
blanking, those that have allowed for its existence—generally
by allowing for unconstrained categorizations or descriptions of
mental states—display preliminary evidence in support of the
blank mind.
The present work aims to investigate the possibility that there
are times when the mind is blank—when conscious awareness is
directed neither toward the present perceptual environment nor
toward stimuli decoupled from this environment, but nowhere.
Mind-blanking shares a fundamental similarity with the well-
established mental state of mind-wandering, in that both states
represent a decoupling of attention from the current perceptual
environment. However, these mental states are also theoretically
distinct; whereas the wandering mind represents a state in which
attention brings stimuli unrelated to the current task or envi-
ronment into conscious awareness, the blank mind seems to
represent a state in which attention fails to bring any stimuli at
all into conscious awareness—the mind is not just elsewhere, but
nowhere.
Several empirically supported characteristics of mind-
wandering may function as points of comparison with
mind-blanking—empirical fingerprints with which to test
the relationship between the two mental states, as well as the
viability of the blank mind as a distinct mental state. First,
mind-wandering is characterized by an ability to recall the prior
contents of consciousness, even if the individual was unaware of
these contents at the time (e.g., Schooler, 2002; Schooler et al.,
2004; Sayette et al., 2009); if people can engage in “mental time
travel” and recall content, they should also be able to recall a
lack of content—or a blank mind. Second, mind-wandering is
associated with impaired performance on tasks that ostensibly
require conscious attention—most notably, reading compre-
hension (e.g., Sayette et al., 2009, 2010; Reichle et al., 2010);
mind-blanking may or may not cause similar deficits on this
behavioral outcome measure. Third, mind-wandering shows
a consistent relationship with meta-awareness, as measured
by the ratio of self-caught to probe-caught instances of the
wandering mind; this ratio ranges from 1.53:1 (Sayette et al.,
2010) to 1.70:1 (Reichle et al., 2010) to 1.95:1 (Sayette et al.,
2009). Because mind-blanking is proposed to have a unique
relationship with conscious awareness, it may also have a unique
relationship with meta-awareness. Fourth, mind-wandering
appears to be part of an adaptive attentional cycling system,
which causes episodes of mind-wandering to oscillate over time
in a pattern anticorrelated with being focused on external stimuli
(e.g., Sonuga-Barke and Castellanos, 2007; Smallwood, 2010;
Schooler et al., 2011; Mooneyham and Schooler, 2013). Mind-
blanking does not seem to fit into the theoretical framework
explaining adaptive attentional cycling (a system for efficiently
monitoring both internal and external stimuli), and thus may
differ from mind-wandering in terms of its relationship with
other mental states (i.e., mind-wandering, being focused) over
time.
In the present research, we provide evidence for the existence
ofmind-blanking—amental state in which attention is decoupled
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from perception and does not bring any stimuli into conscious
awareness. Because mind-wandering, like mind-blanking, rep-
resents a decoupling of attention and perception, many of the
following experiments make use of techniques pioneered in the
mind-wandering literature and focus on comparing and con-
trasting these seemingly related mental states. Experiment 1
explores phenomenological differences between mind-blanking
and mind-wandering by examining whether or not people
report both mind-blanking and mind-wandering as experien-
tially distinct mental states. Experiments 2a–2c examine poten-
tial differences between mind-blanking and mind-wandering
on a behavioral outcome measure: reading comprehension.
Experiments 3a–3c address two areas that may reveal differences
in the cognitive processes underlying mind-blanking and mind-
wandering: the ratio of probe-caught to self-caught episodes
(a potential marker of the relationship between each mental state
and meta-awareness) and the relationship of each mental state
with time. Together, these seven experiments outline the blank
mind in terms of four key characteristics of decoupled men-
tal states: phenomenological experience, behavioral outcomes,
meta-awareness, and patterns of occurrence over time.
EXPERIMENT 1: PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE
People often refer to the blank mind as if it represents a unique
experience, using phrases such as “I blanked out” or “my mind
was a complete blank.” However, these phrases may simply rep-
resent imprecise language; they may refer not to the blank mind
per se, but instead to experiences such as the inability to produce a
particular piece of information (as in the tip-of-the-tongue phe-
nomenon; e.g., Brown and McNeill, 1966; Brown, 1991) or the
realization that one’s attention has turned away from the task
at hand (as in mind-wandering; e.g., Wegner, 1997; Schooler
et al., 2004; Mason et al., 2007). In this experiment, we inves-
tigate whether or not mind-blanking is a phenomenologically
distinct mental state by comparing it to another state involv-
ing the decoupling of perception and attention: mind-wandering.
Does mind-blanking feel different than mind-wandering? Are
these conceptually unique mental states experienced as such?
Or are these mental states identical from the perspective of the
mind-blanking and/or mind-wandering individual?
METHOD
Twenty-three participants (15 female and 8 male) were recruited
from the Harvard University Psychology Study Pool; participants
had a mean age of 31.67 years. As in previous studies on mind-
wandering (e.g., Sayette et al., 2009, 2010; Reichle et al., 2010),
these participants completed a reading task during which they
were probed with questions about their mental states; probes
occurred randomly, at intervals ranging from 2 to 4min. In con-
trast to previous studies of mind-wandering, probes consisted of
questions about three different mental states: mind-wandering,
mind-blanking, and being focused.
Prior to the experimental task, participants were told that they
would be probed throughout the reading task with questions
about their immediately preceding mental states. Prior research
suggests that people are able to report on prior contents of con-
sciousness, even if they were not aware of them at the time (e.g.,
Schooler, 2002; Schooler et al., 2004); if people are able to provide
post-hoc reports about previously unnoticed mental contents,
they should also be able to report an immediately preceding lack
of mental content.
Participants were then presented with definitions for “mind-
wandering,” “mind-blanking,” and “being focused.” These mental
states were presented as hypothetical possibilities, as opposed to
empirically validated categories of conscious experience. The def-
inition of mind-wandering was borrowed from prior research
(Sayette et al., 2009), and read: “at some point during read-
ing, you realize that you have no idea what you just read;
furthermore, not only were you not really thinking about the
text, you were thinking about something else altogether.” The
description of mind-blanking was similar to that for mind-
wandering, in that it involved being off-task (that is, decoupling
attention from perception); however, the description described
a state of complete blankness: “not only were you not really
thinking about the text, you were not thinking about anything
at all—your mind was a complete blank.” Being focused was
described as “paying attention to the text that you were read-
ing.” Together, these mental states encompassed three possible
links between attention and conscious awareness: attention could
be directed toward the task at hand (“being focused”); atten-
tion could be directed toward anything other than the task
at hand (“mind-wandering”); or attention could be directed
toward nothing at all (“mind-blanking”). After participants had
been presented with all three definitions, the differences between
mind-blanking and mind-wandering were reiterated, and partici-
pants were verbally examined to ensure understanding of all three
concepts as well as the differences between a blank mind and a
wandering mind.
The experimental task consisted of a 45-min session in which
participants were asked to read from the first 6 chapters of
Tolstoy’s War and Peace, a task that has been shown to elicit
mind-wandering (Sayette et al., 2009). While reading, partic-
ipants were randomly probed with questions related to their
mental states. Probes consisted of an audible chime paired with
a subsequent computer-based questionnaire asking about partic-
ipants’ mental state immediately prior to the chime. These com-
puter screens consisted of two-word probes for each target men-
tal state: mind-wandering (“Mind Wandering?”), mind-blanking
(“Mind-Blank?”), and being focused (“Mind Focused?”). For
each probe, participants were asked to respond by pressing “y”
for yes or “n” for no. Participants received 6 randomly ordered
probes of each type, separated by 2- to 4-min. intervals. Self-
classified external probes such as these have been used in prior
studies assessing the contents of consciousness, and are par-
ticularly useful because they do not require individuals to be
consciously aware of the contents of their experience while in
the midst of this experience (Giambra, 1995; Smallwood and
Schooler, 2006). The use of probes in this experiment also
reduced the cognitive demands placed on participants; a self-
catchmethodology requiring participants to consistently monitor
for both mind-wandering and mind-blanking may have cre-
ated a cognitively taxing experimental environment, and this
setting may have decreased the accuracy and reliability of the
resulting data.
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RESULTS
Participants reported experiencing all three mental states: mind-
blanking, mind-wandering, and being focused, with a mean
response time for each mental state probe of 3.14 s. Means and
standard deviations for eachmental state are presented in Table 1.
Each mean represents the number of times each mental state was
reported out of a total of 6 possible probes. Each percentage rep-
resents the percentage of mental state probes that were responded
to with an answer of “yes,” indicating that the identified mental
state was being experienced immediately prior to the appearance
of the probe. Each probe asked about only one mental state at a
time; thus, any answer of “no” could indicate that the participant
was experiencing either of the two other mental states (e.g., a par-
ticipant answering “no” to a focus-probe could have been either
mind-blanking or mind-wandering).
We also tested for correlations between mental states.
Mind-wandering was negatively correlated with being focused,
r(23) = −0.71, p < 0.001. Mind-blanking, on the other hand,
was uncorrelated with both mind-wandering, r(23) = −0.06,
p = 0.80, and being focused, r(23) = −0.26, p = 0.24.
DISCUSSION
These results provide evidence that mind-blanking and mind-
wandering are phenomenologically distinct mental states.
Participants, informed of potential differences between these
two states (but in no way guaranteed that both exist), reported
both mind-blanking and mind-wandering. The fact that mind-
blanking was reported at all suggests that people are famil-
iar with this experience, even when it is defined in terms
of more precise language than may be found in lay descrip-
tions of conscious states (i.e., “I was not thinking about any-
thing at all” as opposed to “I blanked out”). The difference in
reported rates of mind-blanking (14.49%) and mind-wandering
(49.28%) mirrors previous results related to the incidence of
each mental state (mind-blanking: 18%, Schooler et al., 2004;
mind-wandering: 46.9%, Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010), and
suggests that people are capable of distinguishing between the
two. The lack of correlation between the two states suggests that
the two terms were not used interchangeably. If mind-blanking
and mind-wandering were positively correlated, this may sug-
gest that people were sloppy categorizers—any off-task mental
state was classified as either mind-blanking or mind-wandering,
depending on the probe presented. If mind-blanking and mind-
wandering were negatively correlated, this may suggest that the
two mental states were identical, but were understood differ-
ently by different people—some classified any off-task mental
Table 1 | Means and SDs of conscious states in Experiment 1.
Mean counts of probed mental states (out of six)
State Mean Percentage Standard deviation
Mind-blanking 0.87 14.49% 1.49
Mind-wandering 2.96 49.28% 1.72
Focused 3.57 59.42% 1.95
state as mind-blanking (and not mind-wandering) whereas oth-
ers classified any off-task mental state as mind-wandering (and
not mind-blanking). The finding that reports of these states were
uncorrelated suggests that they are phenomenologically distinct,
and that the rate of experiencing one is not necessarily related to
the rate of experiencing the other.
Although these results suggest that people experience mind-
blanking and mind-wandering as phenomenologically distinct
mental states, the differences between these states may be either
qualitative or quantitative. Mind-wandering represents a men-
tal state in which attention is decoupled from perception, and
directed elsewhere—the mind contains conscious content, this
content is simply unconstrained by the current physical or
temporal setting. If mind-blanking truly represents a lack of
conscious awareness and the persistence of perception in the
absence of attention, mind-blanking and mind-wandering seem
to be qualitatively different; although both entail a decoupling of
perception from attention, conscious awareness persists during
mind-wandering but is absent during mind-blanking. However,
it may also be that mind-blanking is simply a quantitatively
different form of mind-wandering. Recent work suggests that
mind-wandering represents a broad category of heterogeneous
experiences, each possibly entailing different psychological pro-
cesses and phenomenological signatures (Smallwood et al., 2013);
it may be that one form of mind-wandering consists of directing
attention to particularly unremarkable or unmemorable stim-
uli, thus creating a mental state that is easily categorized as a
blank mind. Although participants reported mind-blanking and
mind-wandering as phenomenologically distinct experiences, it is
possible that apparent qualitative differences between these men-
tal states may in fact reflect quantitative differences related to
the memorability of mental contents present during decoupled
mental states.
People’s demonstrated ability to perform “mental time
travel”—that is, to analyze the contents of their own conscious-
ness after-the-fact—suggests that mind-blanking may be qual-
itatively, not quantitatively, different from mind-wandering. In
the case of mind-wandering, participants are able to report what
they were previously thinking about, even though they were
ostensibly unaware of it at the time (Schooler, 2002; Schooler
et al., 2004). If people are able to report the contents of their
thoughts after-the-fact, then they should also be able to report
the absence of thought—that is, the experience of mind-blanking.
Research suggests that even unattended and irrelevant informa-
tion can be explicitly remembered after-the-fact (e.g., Hoffman
et al., 2011), suggesting that information does not need to be
particularly engaging in order to be reported post-hoc, and that
reports of blankness are unlikely to simply reflect an inability to
recall mundane or monotonous thoughts.
However, it may be more difficult to recall certain types
of thoughts after-the-fact, even if this recollection is pos-
sible. Perhaps some thoughts—those that are irrelevant or
uninteresting—are less memorable to start with, and may
fade from memory more quickly than others. Mind-wandering
directed toward these sorts of particularly forgettable thoughts
might be experienced or remembered as mind-blanking; reports
of mind-blanking would still reflect the occurrence of a
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phenomenologically distinct state, but this distinction from
mind-wandering would be related to an inability to remem-
ber conscious contents, rather than a true lack of content. The
current experiment used probes in order to combat the poten-
tial issue of miscategorization based on memory failure. Mental
state probes minimize memory requirements by asking partic-
ipants to report mental states as close to in-the-moment as
possible; probes interrupt mental states as they are occurring,
and simply ask participants to indicate their conscious con-
tents in the instant before the probe. In this experiment, mean
response time to the specific, two-word probes was only 3.14 s;
within this short span, participants attended to the probe, read
the probe, assessed their mental state, and responded. People’s
general ability to explicitly recall previously unnoticed mental
contents, the immediate nature of mental state probes in gen-
eral, and the short response time to the probes used in this
experiments suggest that reports of mind-blanking—both here
and elsewhere—may not simply reflect miscategorizations due
to memory failure. Rather, mind-blanking and mind-wandering
may represent two qualitatively different, but related, mental
states.
EXPERIMENTS 2a– 2c: BEHAVIORAL OUTCOMES
Experiment 1 focuses on internal experience, suggesting that
people experience mind-blanking and mind-wandering as two
phenomenologically distinct mental states. In these experiments,
we turn our focus from the internal experience of mind-blanking
to external, behavioral outcomes associated with this mental state.
Specifically, we investigate the effect of mind-blanking on reading
comprehension, a common marker of the ability to attend to and
process stimuli present in the immediate environment.
Experiments 2a, 2b, and 2c are based on the “zoning-out dur-
ing reading” task (e.g., Schooler et al., 2004), which is often used
to examine the effect of mind-wandering on task-related perfor-
mance. This task consists of assessing participants’ mental states
while they read a block of dense text. After the reading period
is finished, participants complete a reading comprehension test.
Correlations between mental states (generally, mind-wandering)
and reading comprehension are then computed in order to assess
the impact of these mental states on performance. Specifics
of the experimental design for each experiment are presented
in Table 2.
EXPERIMENTS 2a AND 2b
Method
These experiments followed nearly identical methodology.
However, they used different methods to ensure the accuracy of
self-reported mind-blanking in each experiment. In both exper-
iments, participants were recruited from the Harvard University
Psychology Study Pool. Upon entering the lab, participants were
asked if they had ever read a piece of classic literature—eitherWar
and Peace (2a) or Anna Karenina (2b); if participants indicated
that they were familiar with the relevant work, they were redi-
rected to another study. The remaining participants were then
informed that they would have 20min to read a selection from
the book, and that they would be tested on the material once the
20min had passed.
Next, participants were given definitions of both mind-
blanking and mind-wandering. These definitions were identical
to those provided in Experiment 1. However, an additional dis-
tinction related to the phenomenological experiences reported by
participants in Experiment 1 was added for this experiment: “The
only difference between mind-wandering and mind-blanking is
that in mind-wandering you’re thinking about something else,
and in mind-blanking you aren’t.”
These experiments used self-catch, as opposed to probe-catch,
measures. In order to reduce latency between the experience of
mind-blanking or mind-wandering and reports of that mental
state, self-reports followed a two-step procedure. First, partici-
pants pressed a button if they realized that they were no longer
attending to the reading. Second, participants pressed one of two
additional buttons to indicate whether their attentional lapse had
been due to mind-blanking or mind-wandering.
Participants in both experiments were required to confirm
their mental state reports. In Experiment 2a, they were asked to
confirm their initial decision by answering the question “Are you
sure?” on a dichotomous yes/no scale. This confirmation check
was designed to encourage participants to engage in “mental time
travel” and ensure that their minds were empty (if they reported
mind-blanking) or contentful (if they reportedmind-wandering).
In Experiment 2b, participants who had just indicated that their
minds were either blank or wandering were subsequently asked
to provide written information in free response form about their
prior mental state, including any memories they had of thoughts
during this state and when or how they realized that their
Table 2 | Experimental design of Experiments 2a, 2b, and 2c.
Experiment Participant
details
Reading material Reading time Reading speed Notes
2a N = 27
15 Female
Mage = 25.38
War and peace 20min Own pace Mental state reports were
double-checked
2b N = 56
33 Female
Mage = 27.90
Anna Karenina 20min Own pace Participants described contents of
preceding mental states
2c N = 75
36 Female
Mage = 29.85
Anna Karenina Unlimited Own pace, auto scrolling None
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thoughts had become divorced from the task at hand. This confir-
mation check was designed to both discourage participants from
reporting artificially high levels of either mental state and gather
information about lay conceptualizations of mind-blanking and
mind-wandering.
After receiving all instructions, participants were quizzed on
the definitions of mind-blanking andmind-wandering, reminded
of the procedures for reporting and confirming/describingmental
states, and given the appropriate text. After 20min, participants
were asked to stop reading and were instructed to complete a 10-
item test of reading comprehension related to the material they
had just seen.
Results
Participants in Experiments 2a and 2b reported both mind-
blanking and mind-wandering. Confirmation checks from each
experiment provided additional evidence that these mental states
are phenomenologically distinct, and that participants were con-
fident about their ability to distinguish between the two. In
Experiment 2a, the majority of initial reports of both mind-
blanking and mind-wandering were doubly confirmed—that is,
participants reported being sure that their minds were blank
and not wandering (or wandering and not blank); see Table 3
for means and standard deviations of each mental state in this
experiment, as well as the percentage of each mental state that
was doubly confirmed. Only doubly confirmed reports of each
mental state are used for all further analyses of results from
Experiment 2a.
In Experiment 2b, spontaneous descriptions of each mental
state suggested that participants conceived of the two states dif-
ferently. For example, one participant described an instance of
mind-blanking by saying “My mind was blank. I realized this
when I was just staring blankly at a sentence and not reading it.
I think I only stared at the sentence for a few seconds before I
snapped out of it,” and an instance of mind-wandering by saying
“My mind was wandering. I realized I was wandering when I was
lost in what I was reading. I remember thinking about something
I have to do later today.” Another participant described a blank-
ing experience when she “found myself staring at the same word
but I don’t remember reading it” and a wandering experience
as “found myself reading but not knowing what I was read-
ing.” Still other participants seem to indicate that the boundary
between mind-blanking and mind-wandering—though clear—
may be easily crossed; for example “at first my mind started to
Table 3 | Means and SDs of conscious states in Experiment 2a.
Mean counts of self-caught mental states (over 20min reading period)
State Mean Standard deviation
Mind-blanking 3.26 4.40
Mind-blanking, confirmed 2.96 4.43
Mind-blanking, % confirmed 81.3% 0.33
Mind-wandering 4.78 5.21
Mind-wandering, confirmed 4.67 5.22
Mind-wandering, % confirmed 96.6% 0.09
wander intentionally as I imagined what it was like to live in the
household that was being described but I was able to read one or
two more sentences while still keeping feeling in the front of my
mind but then went blank.” All reports of both mind-blanking
and mind-wandering are used for further analysis of results from
Experiment 2b.
As in Experiment 1, reports of mind-blanking and mind-
wandering were uncorrelated in both Experiment 2a, r(27) =
0.172, p = 0.39, and Experiment 2b, r(56) = −0.173, p = 0.20.
In line with previous research on mind-wandering, increased
incidence of mind-wandering was correlated with decreased per-
formance on the reading comprehension test in both Experiment
2a, r(26) = −0.40, p = 0.04, r2 = 0.16 and Experiment 2b,
r(56) = −0.41, p < 0.01, r2 = 0.17. Mind-blanking, on the other
hand, did not affect scores on the reading comprehension test in
either Experiment 2a, r(26) = −0.005, p = 0.98, or Experiment
2b, r(56) = 0.06, p = 0.68. A follow-up stepwise multiple regres-
sion with mind-wandering and mind-blanking as possible pre-
dictors of test performance confirmed that mind-wandering
accounted for all differences on performance in Experiment 2a:
full regression F(1, 25) = 4.56, p = 0.04; βwander = −0.40, t =
−2.14, p = 0.04; βblank = ns. A second stepwise multiple regres-
sion with the same factors for Experiment 2b confirmed that
mind-wandering accounted for all difference in test performance
in this experiment: full regression F(1, 54) = 10.74, p < 0.01;
βwander = −0.41, t = −3.28, p < 0.01; βblank = ns.
Discussion
Results from these experiments both corroborate the findings
of Experiment 1—that mind-blanking and mind-wandering are
phenomenologically distinct experiences—and provide evidence
that these mental states are associated with different behavioral
outcomes. As in Experiment 1, participants reported both mind-
blanking and mind-wandering, and these two mental states were
not correlated with each other. As an expansion of Experiment 1,
participants were asked to re-assess their initial reports of both
mind-blanking and mind-wandering, and either confirm their
initial reports (Experiment 2a) or describe their preceding mental
contents (or lack thereof, Experiment 2b). Although participants
in Experiment 2a seemed to be more confident about reports
of mind-wandering (96.6% confirmed) than about reports of
mind-blanking (81.3% confirmed), both mental states were con-
firmed more often than not. Free response descriptions from
Experiment 2b provide further evidence that people both experi-
ence and describe these mental states differently, and are capable
of distinguishing between them.
The possibility of blurred boundaries between mind-blanking
and mind-wandering, as reported in Experiment 2b, may
provide insight into the relatively low confirmation rate for
mind-blanking, relative to mind-wandering, in Experiment 2a.
Although these mental states are distinct, they may often fade
from one to the other (e.g., “at first my mind started to wan-
der . . . but then went blank”). When confirming a wandering
mind, one must only confirm that his or her thoughts were
unrelated to the immediate situation. However, when confirm-
ing a blank mind, one must confirm that he or she had no
thoughts whatsoever. If these two states are often fading back
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and forth—frommind-blanking to mind-wandering—memories
of stray thoughts may taint confirmations of mind-blanking
and introduce uncertainty into initial mental state judgments.
Just like a drop of poison contaminates a glass of water but a
drop of water does nothing to purify a glass of poison, a single
remembered thought may taint categorizations of the blank mind
whereas moments of blankness may not affect categorizations of
mind-wandering.
Further data from this experiment indicate that mind-
blanking and mind-wandering are associated with different
behavioral outcomes. Specifically, mind-wandering seems to
impair reading comprehension, whereas mind-blanking does not.
Evidence from previous mind-wandering studies suggests that
people’s eyes continue to move across the page while their minds
wander (e.g., Schooler et al., 2004; Reichle et al., 2010). This
suggests that they are unaware that their attention has drifted else-
where, and provides a prime example of the decoupling of percep-
tion and attention; perception (and the appearance of conscious
processing) persists in the absence of attention (and a corre-
sponding absence of conscious awareness of the unattended text).
Mind-wandering “readers” may continue to maintain the appear-
ance of reading, while failing to process information contained
within the text—an irony that becomes apparent when these
individuals are tested on the material that their eyes scanned,
but their minds failed to process. Although many behaviors
do not seem to require attention or conscious awareness, the
deleterious effects of mind-wandering on reading comprehen-
sion suggests that processing dense text does require conscious
awareness.
Mind-blanking, too, seems to represent a decoupling of per-
ception from attention; however, this state does not seem to
impair reading comprehension. At least three possible explana-
tions could account for this lack of connection between mind-
blanking—a mental state that ostensibly prevents the individual
from consciously processing stimuli—and reading comprehen-
sion. First, it may be that both mind-blankers and mind-
wanderers appear to attend to the reading task (e.g., by moving
their eyes across the page) while their attention is elsewhere
(or, in the case of mind-blanking, nowhere). If this is the case,
the only difference between the two states may be the typical
duration of each mental state; mind-wandering, an immersive
experience, may continue for pages at a time whereas mind-
blanking, a state defined by the lack of experience, may occur
only briefly and intermittently—unlike mind-wandering, there
is no narrative arc or constant concern to extend the length of
periods of mind-blanking. If this is the case, mind-blanking may
result in less missed text relative to mind-wandering, and may
consequently have less deleterious effects on tasks that require
conscious awareness (such as reading comprehension).
A second, and related, possibility is that the less immersive
experience of mind-blanking is more easily interrupted by a
task that requires conscious attention. During mind-wandering,
attention may be directed to an engaging or important stim-
ulus or train of thought; during mind-blanking, on the other
hand, attention is directed nowhere. Thus, mind-blankers may be
more likely than mind-wanderers to “snap out of it” and return
to the task at hand when this task requires attention. Unlike
mind-wanders, mind-blankers have no conflict over which stream
of information is more worthy of their attention.
The first two explanations suggest that mind-blanking pro-
duces less interference thanmind-wandering for tasks that require
conscious attention; mind-blanking is either intermittent and
short-lived, or easily interrupted by stimuli requiring conscious
attention. Conversely, the third explanation suggests that mind-
blanking may interfere more than mind-wandering for tasks that
require conscious attention. It may be that mind-blanking entails
not just a lack of conscious awareness, but also a correspond-
ing failure to display the hallmarks of conscious awareness (in
this case, moving one’s eyes across a page of text without actu-
ally attending to this information). Basic activities (e.g., walking,
driving, and other well-practiced behaviors) may persist while
mind-blanking, but actions that require conscious attention may
not only fail to occur, but also fail to appear as if they are occur-
ring. In the case of reading, this would cause people to stop
moving their eyes across the page when their minds go blank.
When their minds return from this state, they may simply pick
back up where they left-off—and avoid suffering the deficits in
reading comprehension that seem to come from maintaining the
appearance of attention without actually attending to the task at
hand (in this case, continuing to move one’s eyes across a page
without processing the information).
EXPERIMENT 2c
Although both mind-blanking and mind-wandering seem to rep-
resent a decoupling of perception and attention, previous results
(Experiments 2a, 2b) indicate that only mind-wandering has a
deleterious effect on processes requiring conscious attention—
specifically, reading comprehension. The present experiment was
designed to investigate potential explanations for this appar-
ent difference between mind-blanking and mind-wandering on
behavioral outcomes. Specifically, we wanted to investigate the
third possibility outlined above: that when mind-blanking, peo-
ple not only stop attending to the current perceptual environ-
ment, but also fail to appear as if they are doing so (at least
when the demands of the environment require conscious atten-
tion). In order to test this explanation for the differing effects of
mind-blanking and mind-wandering on performance, we exam-
ined whether forcing people to read auto-scrolling text—text that
they could not simply pick back up where they left-off—would
eliminate the difference between each decoupled mental state’s
effects on behavioral performance as found in Experiments 2a
and 2b.
Method
Seventy-five participants (36 female and 39 male) were recruited
from the Harvard University Psychology Study Pool; partici-
pants had a mean age of 29.85 years. The experimental design
was similar to that used in Experiments 2a and 2b, with the
exception that participants were divided into two reading con-
ditions. Participants in both conditions were assigned to read
a passage from Anna Karenina, but those in the “self-paced”
condition could read at their own pace, whereas those in the
“auto-scrolling” condition read text as it automatically scrolled
across a computer screen (at a speed chosen by each participant to
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be neither too slow nor too fast). If different relationships between
each mental state (mind-blanking, mind-wandering) and read-
ing comprehension are due to mind-blankers being more likely
thanmind-wanderers to pick up reading where they left-off, auto-
scrolling text should prevent this strategy—and eliminate the
apparent differences in behavioral outcomes associated with these
mental states.
Participants were provided with the definitions of mind-
blanking and mind-wandering used in all other experiments.
Once it was clear that they understood these definitions, they
were administered the reading task and told that there would
be a quiz once this task was finished. Participants in the “self-
paced” condition were allowed as much time as they needed to
finish the passage, whereas those in the “auto-scrolling” condition
were required to read the text as it scrolled by at their pre-selected
speed. As in Experiments 2a and 2b, participants were instructed
to press a button any time they noticed that their attention was
no longer focused on the task, then select whether they had been
blanking or wandering. After participants finished the reading
task, they were administered a reading comprehension test.
Results
As in all other experiments, participants reported both mind-
blanking and mind-wandering, and these reports were not cor-
related with each other, r(75) = 0.105, p = 0.37.
For participants in the self-paced condition, which mirrored
the experimental design of Experiments 2a and 2b, mind-
wandering was negatively correlated with performance on a
reading comprehension text, r(38) = −0.463, p < 0.01, r2 = 0.21;
mind-blanking, again as in Experiments 2a and 2b, was not,
r(38) < 0.001, p = 1.00. A follow-up stepwise multiple regres-
sion with mind-wandering and mind-blanking as possible pre-
dictors of test performance confirmed that mind-wandering
accounted for all differences on performance: full regression
F(1, 37) = 9.81, p < 0.01; βwander = −0.46, t = −3.13, p < 0.01;
βblank = ns.
However, participants in the auto-scrolling condition dis-
played a different pattern of results. As in the self-paced condition,
mind-wandering was negatively correlated with performance on a
reading comprehension test, r(37) = −0.357, p = 0.03, r2 = 0.13.
However, unlike in all previous experiments, mind-blanking in
the auto-scrolling condition was also associated with impaired
performance on a reading comprehension test, r(37) = −0.383,
p = 0.02, r2 = 0.15. A follow-up stepwise multiple regression
with mind-wandering and mind-blanking as possible predic-
tors of test performance confirmed that both mind-wandering
and mind-blanking influenced test performance: full regression
F(1, 36) = 5.66, p < 0.01; βwander = −0.35, t = −2.35, p = 0.03;
βblank = −0.32, t = −2.16, p = 0.04. A comparison of Fisher’s
(1915) z-scores for correlations between mind-blanking and test
performance in the self-paced and auto-scrolling conditions con-
firmed that mind-blanking was more related to test performance
in the auto-scrolling condition than in the self-paced condi-
tion, z = 1.68, p = 0.04. Plotted regression equations in Figure 1
display the effect of each mental state (mind-wandering, mind-
blanking) on reading comprehension, when incidence of the
other mental state is held constant.
FIGURE 1 | Relationship between mind-blanking, mind-wandering,
and reading comprehension, under both self-paced and auto-scrolling
conditions in Experiment 2c.
Discussion
Results from this experiment provide evidence that apparent dif-
ferences in the effects of mind-blanking and mind-wandering on
behavioral outcomes requiring conscious attention (e.g., read-
ing comprehension) may be due to differences in the persistence
of processes related to the appearance of conscious attention;
these processes seem to be prevalent while mind-wandering, but
less prevalent (or perhaps non-existent) while mind-blanking.
When people’s minds wander, their eyes continue to move across
the page and, upon returning from mind-wandering, they may
continue reading from where their eyes left off—and not from
where they stopped attending to the text; as a result, they may
miss large portions of information and suffer deficits on tests of
reading comprehension. When people’s minds go blank, how-
ever, it appears that they momentarily pause not just the act of
attending to external information, but also the appearance of
doing so. When these people return from mind-blanking, they
may pick up from where they stopped paying attention—a posi-
tion that, unlike in mind-wandering, coincides with where they
appeared to stop engaging with the external world. Results from
this experiment suggest that mind-blanking may be less likely
than mind-wandering to result in glossing over important infor-
mation, and may thus be less likely to result in deficits on tests
of behaviors dependent on conscious awareness (e.g., reading
comprehension).
These results suggest that mind-blanking represents a more
complete break from conscious awareness than does mind-
wandering; whereas mind-wanderers let their attention drift
elsewhere while they appear to attend to the task at hand, mind-
blanking individuals suspend both paying attention to the exter-
nal task and appearing to do so. Both states seem to allow for
the processing of information that does not require conscious
attention (that is, processing that can occur automatically based
solely on perceptual input that need not reach conscious aware-
ness). However, neither state allows people to process external
information that does require conscious attention. Individuals in
a state of mind-wandering exhibit the external signs of attending
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to this information, even though their attention is truly directed
elsewhere. Mind-blanking individuals, on the other hand, do not
exhibit these external hallmarks of attention; while in this state,
their lack of conscious awareness does not seem to be disguised
by appearances of attention—deceptive appearances which, in the
case of operations actually requiring conscious attention (such
as reading comprehension), may be associated with negative
behavioral outcomes.
EXPERIMENTS 3a– 3c: META-AWARENESS AND TIME
Experiments 1 and 2 provide evidence that mind-blanking has a
distinct psychological signature, both in terms of phenomenol-
ogy (what mind-blanking “feels” like to the internal experiencer)
and behavioral outcomes (effects of mind-blanking that may
be apparent to outside observers). The following experiments
analyze additional characteristics of the blank mind that may
often elude detection, both internally and externally: the relation-
ship of mind-blanking with meta-awareness, and the occurrence
of mind-blanking over time. These characteristics have been
explored previously in the domain of mind-wandering, and may
provide additional insight into the cognitive processes underlying
mind-blanking. The following experiments also provide further
confirmation of several results presented in Experiments 1 and
2, including the patterns of correlations between mind-blanking
and mind-wandering and the behavioral outcomes associated
with each mental state.
METHOD
Experiments 3a, 3b, and 3c were designed to complement each
other. Like Experiments 2a–2c, each uses a methodology based
on the “zoning out while reading” task (e.g., Sayette et al., 2009,
2010; Reichle et al., 2010). However, each experiment includes
minor tweaks—related, for example, to the mental states assessed,
the method used to measure these mental states, and the orga-
nization of the reading period. Specifics of experimental design
for each experiment are presented in Table 4; methodological
details and specifics of analysis for each experiment—as well as
additional data collected in Experiment 1—are provided in the
Appendix. Together, these closely related experiments allow for
deeper insight into mind-blanking without imposing unneces-
sary cognitive demands on participants. Due to their interrelated
nature, the results and implications of these experiments will be
discussed together.
These experiments followed the basic protocol of the stan-
dard “zoning-out during reading” task (e.g., Schooler et al., 2004).
Each participant was assigned to read a block of dense text (in
this case, War and Peace). Prior to reading, participants in all
experiments received descriptions of both mind-wandering and
mind-blanking (see descriptions in Experiment 1). Participants
were required to verbally confirm understanding of each concept.
Participants then began the reading task; after the reading task
was finished, participants completed a reading comprehension
test (Experiment 1, Experiment 3a). Finally, participants filled out
a demographic questionnaire and were debriefed.
Mental states while reading were assessed using both probe
and self-catch measures, both in the lab (1, 3a) and at home (3b,
3c). Data for home sessions were collected using Amazon mTurk,
which provides a more diverse sample than lab-based meth-
ods while maintaining equivalent levels of reliability (Buhrmester
et al., 2011). In experiments using probes, probes were randomly
administered at time intervals ranging from 2 to 4min; this repli-
cates previous mind-wandering research using the “zoning out
while reading” task (e.g., Sayette et al., 2009, 2010; Reichle et al.,
2010). In experiments using self-catchmethods, participants were
asked to press the spacebar on a computer whenever they noticed
they were off-task (3a) or blank (3b, 3c); if asked to report being
off-task (3a), they subsequently categorized their prior mental
state as either blanking or wandering.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive statistics and phenomenology
If mind-blanking represents a phenomenologically distinct men-
tal state, people should report experiencing both mind-blanking
and the seemingly related mental state of mind-wandering (as in
Experiments 1 and 2). Participants reported both mind-blanking
and mind-wandering, through self-catch measures (3a, 3b, 3c)
and in response to probes (1, 3c). A paired-samples t-test revealed
that self-catch reports of each mental state did not differ; partic-
ipants reported both mind-blanking (M = 3.26, SD = 4.4) and
mind-wandering (M = 4.78, SD = 5.21) at similar rates, t(26) =
1.27, p = 0.215 (3a). However, a second-paired-samples t-test
revealed that probes were more likely to catch mind-wandering
(M = 2.96, SD = 1.72) than mind-blanking (M = 0.87, SD =
1.49), t(22) = 4.29, p < 0.001 (1). This discrepancy suggests that
the measurement technique used to assess each mental state
Table 4 | Experimental design of Experiments 3a, 3b, and 3c.
Experiment Participant
details
Location Reading time Mental states assessed Measurement method
3a N = 27
13 Female
Mage = 28.61
Lab 20min Blanking, wandering Self-Catch
3b N = 108
74 Female
Mage = 33.69
Home Two blocks, 6min each Blanking Self-Catch
3c N = 143
82 Female
Mage = 33.30
Home 30min Blanking Probes,Self-Catch
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may produce different estimates of that state’s occurrence. In
particular, it may be that probe-catch methods underestimate
the incidence of mind-blanking; although probe-catch meth-
ods indicated lower levels of each mental state than self-catch
methods did, this discrepancy was more pronounced for mind-
blanking (Mself = 3.26, Mprobe = 0.87; Mdiff = 2.39) than for
mind-wandering (Mself = 4.78,Mprobe = 2.98;Mdiff = 1.82).
Meta-awareness
Self- and probe-caught reports of mental states can be used
to assess the relationship between this mental state and meta-
awareness (Schooler et al., 2011). The discrepancy between self-
and probe-caught instances of mind-blanking suggests that this
mental state is more likely to be self-caught than caught by
probes, and the apparently larger discrepancy between these
two measurement methods for mind-blanking relative to mind-
wandering suggests that these two mental states may have
different relationships with meta-awareness—specifically, meta-
awareness may be more likely to interrupt mind-blanking than
mind-wandering. A paired-samples t-test comparing the output
of each measurement technique when administered during the
same experimental period revealed that mind-blanking was sig-
nificantly more likely to be caught by self-catch methods (M =
5.01, SD = 6.62) than by probes (M = 1.23, SD = 1.54), at a
ratio of 4.07:1 (3c). Despite our use of an identical methodol-
ogy, this ratio differs markedly from ratios of self- to probe-
caught mind-wandering identified in previous research, which
range from 1.53:1 (Sayette et al., 2010) to 1.70:1 (Reichle et al.,
2010) to 1.95:1 (Sayette et al., 2009). These results suggest that
mind-blanking may be more likely than mind-wandering to be
self-caught before it can be caught by an external probe.
The contrasting relationships between these mental states and
meta-awareness may be related to potential differences in the
adaptive qualities of each mental state. Although evidence sug-
gests that mind-wandering may serve various adaptive functions
(e.g., Baars, 2010; Baird et al., 2011), it is unclear whether or
not mind-blanking is similarly adaptive. If mind-blanking is less
adaptive than mind-wandering, the mind may monitor and cor-
rect for the blank mind more than the wandering mind, causing
mind-blankers to “snap out of it” before they can be confronted
by a probe. The propensity of mind-blankers to catch themselves
before they are confronted by probes could also be due to basic
properties of mind-blanking; it may be that instances of mind-
blanking are typically shorter than mind-wandering episodes,
even without the interference of meta-awareness. Although the
reason for the apparent difference between mind-blanking and
mind-wandering in terms of their relationships with meta-
awareness is unclear—it may be due to properties of meta-
awareness, properties of the blank mind itself, or still other
phenomena—the existence of this difference suggests that mind-
blanking and mind-wandering, though closely related, may be
associated with different underlying cognitive processes.
Time
The world abounds with potentially relevant stimuli, and the
ability to attend to as much of this information as possible may
enable individuals to function in a maximally adaptive fashion.
One way of attending to multiple stimuli within the confounds
of an attentional system that seems to allow only one target of
conscious awareness at a time (e.g., James, 1907; Baars, 1997)
may be to engage in attentional cycling (e.g., Schooler et al., 2011;
Mooneyham and Schooler, 2013), a system that entails rhythmi-
cally shifting one’s attentional focus between multiple potentially
relevant streams of information. Because both being focused and
mind-wandering require attention (directed either toward the
task at hand or toward some stimulus-independent thought) and
generally entail conscious awareness, the existence of an adaptive
attentional cycling system would suggest that these mental states
should be negatively correlated over time—increases in one state
at any given time should be associated with decreases in another.
If mind-blanking, which does not entail conscious awareness, is
not a part of this system of attentional cycling, then it should not
be correlated with either mind-wandering or being focused over
time.
Reports of mind-wandering over time seem to support the
attentional cycling hypothesis (e.g., Fox et al., 2005; Sonuga-
Barke and Castellanos, 2007; Smallwood, 2010; Schooler et al.,
2011). Mind-wandering showed a significant cubic trend over
time F(1, 26) = 12.14, p < 0.01 (3a) and was anticorrelated with
being focused over time, r(7) = −0.663, p = 0.05 (1), suggest-
ing that the mental states of mind-wandering and focusing on
external stimuli follow alternating cubic trends. See Figure 2 for
average incidences of mind-wandering and external focus, as well
as mind-blanking, over the course of a 45-min reading task (1).
Mind-blanking, on the other hand, does not seem to be a part
of this attentional cycle; rather, occurrences of mind-blanking
appear to stay somewhat steady over time. Probe-caught reports
of mind-blanking increased over time, r(7) = 0.80, p < 0.01 (1),
and self-caught reports of mind-blanking decreased over time,
F(1, 26) = 6.84, p = 0.02 (3a). When probe- and self-catch mea-
sures were administered together together, the ratio of probe- to
self-caught blanking increased with the passage of time, t(62) =
6.83, p < 0.001, with rmean = 0.39 (3c). Together, these data
suggest that the incidence of mind-blanking per se may not fluc-
tuate considerably over time, but that the relative incidence of
probe- and self-caught mind-blanking changes as task duration
increases, such that blanking is relatively more likely to be caught
by probes than by the self as people continue to engage in a given
task.
This pattern of results suggests that the relationship of mind-
blanking and meta-awareness changes over time, and that people
FIGURE 2 | Average incidence of mind-blanking, mind-wandering, and
focusing on external stimuli in Experiment 1.
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become less aware of mind-blanking as time goes on unless they
are forced to introspect upon their mental states by an external
force (e.g., a probe). Results from Experiment 3b suggest that
this apparent shift in the relationship between mind-blanking
and meta-awareness is not simply an artifact of experimen-
tal design. In this experiment, participants reported self-caught
mind-blanking in two back-to-back reading periods; a decreasing
trend of reports over time occurred within each reading period,
Ftime(1, 212) = 45.14, p < 0.001, but total mind-blanking did not
differ between the two periods, Fperiod(1, 212) = 1.69, p = 0.20
(3b). If decreasing reports of self-caught mind-blanking over time
were simply due to experimental artifacts such as hypervigilance
when first monitoring for this mental state—which could lead
people to over-report the blank mind early on, before becoming
comfortable with the experimental paradigm—one would expect
decreases in reports of mind-blanking over time to only occur
during each participant’s first experience with self-monitoring
mental states; however, these results indicate that such a habit-
uation or acclimatization effect does not occur, as reports of
mind-blanking exhibited the same pattern over time even when
tested in two back-to-back experimental sessions. It seems that
the apparent shift between self-caught and probe-caught blanking
over experimental periods is not an artifact of the experimental
environment, but is due to the nature of the relationship between
mind-blanking and meta-awareness.
Taken together, these analyses of the relationship between
mental states—mind-blanking, mind-wandering, and attending
to external stimuli—and time suggest that mind-blanking and
mind-wandering may occupy two different roles within the
taxonomy of human attention. Mind-wandering, or stimulus-
independent thought, may be part of an adaptive attentional
cycling process allowing organisms to monitor multiple relevant
streams of information. Mind-blanking, on the other hand, does
not seem to be a part of this cyclical system; rather, it seems to
occur less frequently than either mind-wandering or focusing on
external stimuli (see Table 1, as well as descriptive statistics from
Experiments 3a–3c), and at a relatively consistent rate over time.
Mind-wandering and being focused are negatively correlated over
time, suggesting that attending to a stimulus-independent train
of thought precludes attending to the present perceptual envi-
ronment; this necessitates that any organism wishing to monitor
multiple streams of information switch attention between inter-
nal and external focal points. Mind-blanking, on the other hand,
is not correlated with either mind-wandering or being focused
over time, suggesting that the blank mind does not interfere with
this cycle.
These differences between mind-blanking and other mental
states in terms of occurrence over time may be related to the fun-
damental nature of the blank mind. Although mind-blanking,
by definition, precludes the individual from attending to any
information, the prevalence of this mental state does not seem
to interfere with the occurrence of other mental states. Mind-
blanking may represent a “blip” in the attentional system, an
unintended lack of conscious awareness that occurs when there
are momentary gaps in the mind’s ability to locate stimuli capa-
ble of breaching the attentional threshold. Or the blankmindmay
represent a baseline mental state—an evolutionarily prior system
of functioning similar to those employed by creatures ostensibly
lacking conscious awareness, upon which all conscious states are
built.
Correlations
Further results from this series of experiments corroborate the
findings of Experiments 1 and 2. As in these experiments, reports
of mind-blanking and mind-wandering were uncorrelated with
each other, r(27) = 0.17 p = 0.39 (3a). As in Experiment 1, this
lack of correlation between mind-blanking and mind-wandering
suggests that these mental states are associated with distinct phe-
nomenological experiences, and that people are capable of reliably
categorizing these experiences.
Test performance
These experiments also confirm the performance-related find-
ings presented in Experiment 2. High levels of mind-wandering
were associated with poor scores on a reading comprehension test,
both when assessed by probes, r(23) = −0.50, p = 0.02, r2 = 0.25
(1), and when assessed using self-report methods, r(27) = −0.40,
p = 0.04, r2 = 0.16 (3a). As in Experiment 2, mind-blanking did
not impair reading comprehension, whether assessed through
probes, r(23) = −0.021, p = 0.92 (1), or through self-catch meth-
ods, r(27) = −0.005, p = 0.98 (3a).
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiments 3a, 3b, and 3c, along with additional
results from Experiment 1, provide insight into the relation-
ship of mind-blanking with meta-awareness and time, and cor-
roborate previous evidence related to the phenomenology and
behavioral outcomes of mind-blanking. These results suggest
that mind-blanking and mind-wandering have distinct cognitive
signatures, in addition to their differing phenomenological prop-
erties and associated behavioral outcomes. Mind-blanking seems
more susceptible than mind-wandering to interruption by meta-
awareness. Perhaps more interestingly, mind-wandering seems to
play an important role in an adaptive attentional cycling sys-
tem that allows the individual to attend to multiple potentially
relevant streams of information. Mind-blanking, on the other
hand, does not appear to be a part of this attentional cycling sys-
tem; unlike mind-wandering, the occurrence of mind-blanking
does not seem to entail direct trade-offs related to other mental
states. This relationship with other mental states over time sug-
gests that mind-blankingmay be either relatively unimportant—a
mere interruption in the link between perception, attention,
and consciousness—or fundamentally important—a founda-
tional mental state upon which this link is built.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Seven experiments provide evidence supporting the existence of
the blank mind as a distinct mental state with a unique psycho-
logical signature. These experiments distinguish mind-blanking
from the seemingly similar mental state of mind-wandering
by indicating that these mental states correspond with distin-
guishable phenomenological experiences (Experiment 1), are
associated with different behavioral outcomes (Experiments 2a,
2b, 2c), display dissimilar relationships with meta-awareness
(Experiments 1, 3a, 3c), and occupy non-overlapping roles within
the system of attentional cycling (Experiments 1, 3a, 3b, 3c);
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see Tables 5–7 for meta-analyses of these results. By differenti-
ating mind-blanking from other mental states—including mind-
wandering—these experiments provide preliminary evidence that
the blank mind exists. This possibility—that there are times when
the mind is neither here nor there, but nowhere—has largely
been ignored by empirical investigations of consciousness and
attention. The present research opens the door for an expanded
taxonomy of mental states, one that allows not just for states
defined by stimulus-dependent or stimulus-independent con-
scious contents, but also for a state defined by a lack of conscious
content altogether.
Table 5 | Meta-analysis: Correlations between mind-blanking and
mind-wandering.
Experiment Effect size Sample size Significance
(r) (n) (p)
Experiment 1 −0.056 23 0.80
Experiment 2a 0.172 27 0.39
Experiment 2b −0.173 56 0.20
Experiment 2c 0.105 75 0.37
Experiment 3a 0.172 27 0.39
Sample weighted
average effect size
0.029 208
Table 6 | Meta-analysis: Effect of mind-blanking on behavioral
outcomes (reading comprehension).
Experiment Effect size Sample size Significance
(r) (n) (p)
Experiment 1 −0.021 23 0.80
Experiment 2a −0.005 26 0.98
Experiment 2b 0.056 56 0.68
Experiment 2c, part 1 0.000 38 1.00
Experiment 3a −0.005 26 0.98
Sample weighted 0.015 169
average effect size
Table 7 | Meta-analysis: Effect of mind-wandering on behavioral
outcomes (reading comprehension).
Experiment Effect size Sample size Significance
(r) (n) (p)
Experiment 1 −0.495 23 0.016
Experiment 2a −0.400 26 0.043
Experiment 2b −0.407 56 0.002
Experiment 2c, part 1 −0.463 38 0.003
Experiment 2c, part 2 −0.357 37 0.030
Experiment 3a −0.400 26 0.043
Sample weighted −0.416 206
average effect size
This mental state may often escape detection, both by outside
observers and by those experiencing it. Many common behav-
iors can be carried out in the absence of conscious awareness, so
mind-blanking may rarely be apparent to outside observers. The
blank mind may also be obscured from internal self-examination;
because conscious thought is the currency of introspection, any
attempt to assess one’s own mental states will necessarily find
thoughts—and, as a result, fail to find a blank mind. This dif-
ficulty in detecting the blank mind may raise concerns related
to demand effects when assessing this mental state through self-
report measures (such as those used in the current research);
if people are unfamiliar with the concept of mind-blanking or
with the practice of assessing their own mental states, self-reports
of mind-blanking may partially reflect a belief that this mental
state should exist, rather than legitimate experiences of the blank
mind.
However, data suggest that reports of mind-blanking are not
simply the result of demand effects. Previous work—including
experience sampling studies (Hurlburt and Heavey, 2001, 2008),
and experiments focused on mind-wandering (Schooler et al.,
2004)—indicates that people often spontaneously describe their
minds as being “blank” in a free-response format. Results from
the current experiments extend these findings. Confirmations of
mind-blanking in Experiment 2a and descriptions of this men-
tal state in Experiment 2b suggest that participants’ reports of
the blank mind represent experiences of a mental state distin-
guishable from other mental states, particularly the ostensibly
similar state of mind-wandering. Moreover, the reliable lack of
an effect of mind-blanking on behavioral outcomes, compared to
the reliable deleterious effect of mind-wandering on these same
outcomes, suggests that self-reports of mind-blanking are signals
of a mental state that is not only phenomenologically distinct,
but also associated with distinct underlying cognitive processes.
These data suggest that self-reports of mind-blanking are, at the
very least, accurate descriptions of a unique mental state; how-
ever, future research could use other measures to yield deeper
insight into the nature of this mental state. For example, pairing
fMRI techniques with self-report methods may allow researchers
to investigate what neural processes, if any, differ between mind-
blanking and other mental states typified by a decoupling of
perception and attention.
Although the blank mind may be difficult to detect—at
least at first—this mental state may make up much of human
mental life. Evidence suggests that people’s minds are removed
from the present perceptual environment nearly half the time
(Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010) and that mind-blanking repre-
sents the second-most common type of attentional lapse (Watts
and Sharrock, 1985). Given these findings, it may be that
mind-blanking accounts for large portions human experience—
whether or not people realize it.
The possibility of mind-blanking as a ubiquitous mental state
is supported by research on the link between consciousness and
attention. Cognitive processes generally consist of both con-
scious and non-conscious elements (e.g., Baars, 1997; Bargh and
Morsella, 2008), and attention plays a fundamental role in deter-
mining the contents of consciousness (e.g., Crick and Koch, 1990;
Posner, 1994). Attention calls into consciousness stimuli and
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phenomena that would otherwise remain relegated to the realm
of non-conscious processing (e.g., James, 1907; Baars, 1997) and
may be focused on the current perceptual environment (stimulus-
dependent thought) or decoupled from the present space and
time (stimulus-independent thought). The link between atten-
tion and conscious awareness seems to impose limits on the
contents of consciousness (e.g., James, 1907; Baars, 1997); specif-
ically, consciousness—defined not in terms of perceptual aware-
ness (e.g., visual, auditory, or other sensory-based and peripheral
awareness of stimuli) but in terms of verbal, representational,
and/or propositional mental contents that form the center of
explicit conscious awareness—may be occupied by only one flow
of information at a time. It seems that whatever stimulus reaches
the threshold of attention enters into conscious awareness, to
the exclusion of all other environmental and intrapsychic stimuli
(e.g., Crick and Koch, 1990, 2003).
Research on attention and consciousness has traditionally
focused on the distinction between stimulus-dependent and
stimulus-independent thought, a focus that implicitly presup-
poses that the attentional threshold is always met, and that
people are always consciously aware of something. However, this
assumption does not follow from any inherent qualities of the
link between attention and consciousness; indeed, disregarding
this unnecessary assumption allows for a more parsimonious
and cognitively efficient model of attention and consciousness.
People have the capacity for conscious awareness—as enabled
by attention—but the possibility of experiencing mental states
defined by conscious awareness does not necessarily suggest that
such mental states are omnipresent. Given that non-conscious
processing is almost certainly evolutionarily prior to conscious
processing, non-conscious cognitive processes continue to deter-
mine much of behavior (e.g., Bargh and Chartrand, 1999), and
conscious cognitive processes rely on limited energy resources
(e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998), it may be that conscious aware-
ness is the exception, rather than the rule. It may be that people’s
minds are blank for much of their daily lives, and attention only
brings stimuli into conscious awareness when these stimuli are
judged to be of potential relevance.
If the blank mind represents times when attention fails to
bring any stimuli into conscious awareness, mind-blanking seems
to be theoretically distinct from the seemingly similar state of
mind-wandering—a period in which attention brings stimuli into
conscious awareness, but these stimuli are not necessarily tied to
the current perceptual environment. The current research also
suggests that these mental states differ in terms of phenomenol-
ogy, behavioral outcomes, and underlying cognitive processes.
However, these mental states are also fundamentally related, in
that they both represent a decoupling of perception and conscious
awareness. Mind-wandering can be understood as a broad cate-
gory of mental states, each with differing attributes (Smallwood
et al., 2013), and future research could explore the ways in which
mind-blanking and mind-wandering are similar, as opposed to
the ways in which they are different.
Future research on the blank mind could also extend beyond
identifying and measuring the blank mind to experimentally
manipulating this mental state. Manipulations of mind-blanking
could yield insight into what, if any, adaptive purpose the blank
mindmight serve. This mental state could merely fill space, acting
as a placeholder when no aspects of the perceptual environment
capture attention and make their way to conscious awareness, or
it could serve important functions—perhaps conserving energy
usually consumed by conscious attention and saving it for when
it is needed (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998), perhaps consolidat-
ing information much like a bout of micro-sleep (e.g., Born and
Wilhelm, 2012), or perhaps—like laughter—acting as a mental
reset mechanism when the mind is trapped in a non-sensical
situation (Minsky, 1984). It may also affect behavior, either
transforming individuals into mindless receptacles particularly
prone to situational influences (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 2005)
or, like a flow state, allowing people to perform intuitively with-
out the unnecessary interruptions of conscious processing (e.g.,
Csikszentmihalyi, 1998).
By outlining properties of the blank mind, the present research
represents a step toward a more complete view of conscious-
ness. It suggests that the blank mind, a mental state defined by
a lack of conscious awareness and enabled by a decoupling of
perception from attention, is distinguishable from other mental
states, including those typified by both stimulus-dependent and
stimulus-independent thought. Perhaps more importantly, the
present research also raises questions—not just about the blank
mind itself, but also about the nature of conscious awareness
more generally. A more complete understanding of the place of
the blank mind within the taxonomy of mental states may allow
greater insight into both human experience and human behavior.
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APPENDIX
METHODOLOGICAL DETAILS FOR EXPERIMENT 1 AND EXPERIMENTS
3a, 3b, AND 3c
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 measured mind-blanking and mind-wandering
during a computer-administered reading assignment using
probes.
Descriptives. Each participant received a total of 18 mental state
probes: 6 mind-blanking probes (“Just now, was your mind
blank?”), 6 mind-wandering probes (“Just now, was your mind
wandering”), and 6 mind-focused probes (“Just now, was your
mind focused?”); probes were answered by pressing the “y” key
for “yes” or the “n” key for “no.” Probes appeared in random
order, separated by a randomly generated time interval ranging
from 2 to 4min. Mean mental state counts represent the raw
number of thought probes that received a “yes” response (out of
six possible probes).
Time Data. Probes were randomly administered by a computer
program; thus, different participants received different probes at
different times. In order to account for this, the 45-min reading
period was divided into nine 5-min blocks. For each block, probe
hit rate for each participant was computed by dividing the num-
ber of “yes” responses for each mental state by the number of
probes for that state. Incidence of each mental state over time was
computed as a correlation between probe hit rate and time block.
Experiment 3a
Experiment 3a measured mind-blanking and mind-wandering
during a computer-administered reading assignment using self-
catch methods.
Descriptives. Participants were instructed to press the spacebar
any time they noticed that they were no longer focused on
the reading assignment. Participants then categorized their pre-
ceding mental state as either mind-wandering (“not only were
you not really thinking about the text, you were thinking about
something else altogether”) or mind-blanking (“you were not
thinking about anything at all – your mind was a complete
blank”). As in Experiment 2a, participants were asked to con-
firm their choice (“Are you sure that you were wandering, and
not blanking?” or “Are you sure that you were blanking, and
not wandering?”); participants answered with an equal degree of
certainty for blanking (M = 0.86, SD = 0.29) and for wander-
ing (M = 0.96, SD = 0.10) t(16) = 1.48, p = 0.158. Mean mental
state counts represent the raw number of self-reported incidences
of each mental state.
Time Data. Self-caught reports of mind-blanking were divided
into twenty 1-min blocks. Incidence of each mental state over
time was computed using repeated-measures ANOVAs.
Experiment 3b
Experiment 3b measured mind-blanking during two back-to-
back computer-administered reading assignments using self-
catch methods.
Descriptives. Participants reported self-caught mind-blanking by
clicking a button labeled “blank” below the text on the computer
screen. Mean mental state counts represent the raw number of
self-reported incidences of mind-blanking.
Time Data. Each 6-min reading period was divided into two 3-
min blocks. The influences of block and time on mind-blanking
were assessed using a univariate ANOVAwith trial block and time
period as IVs and self-reports of mind-blanking as the DV.
Experiment 3c
Experiment 3c measured mind-blanking during a computer-
administered reading assignment using both probes and self-
catch methods.
Descriptives. Each participant received a total of 10mind-
blanking probes (“Just now, was your mind blank?”); probes were
answered by clicking either “yes” or “no” on a pop-up com-
puter menu. Probes appeared in random order, separated by
a randomly generated time interval ranging from 2 to 4min.
Participants reported self-caught mind-blanking by clicking on a
button labeled “blank” below the text on the computer screen.
Mean mental state counts for probes represent the raw num-
ber of thought probes that received a “yes” response (out of
ten possible probes); mean mental state counts for self-catch
methods represent the raw number of self-reported incidences of
mind-blanking.
Time Data. Reports of mind-blanking were dummy-coded
according to assessment type (0= self-caught, 1= probe-caught).
Each participant’s responses were used to create a number string
(e.g., 001010); this string reflects both the total incidence of
blanking (length of string) and the method by which each inci-
dence of blanking was assessed (value of integer). Each indi-
vidual’s string was then correlated with an increasing number
sequence (i.e., 123456). The resulting correlations represent the
degree to which the ratio of probe-caught to self-caught blank-
ing changes over time, with positive correlations indicating that
blanking is becoming relatively more probe-caught and negative
correlations indicating that blanking is becoming relatively more
self-caught. Individual correlations were converted to Fisher’s
(1915) z-scores in order to correct for the non-normal distri-
bution of correlation coefficients. Z-scores were then analyzed
using a one-sample t-test with a test value of 0; values signifi-
cantly greater than zero indicate that mind-blanking is becoming
relatively more probe-caught over time, and values significantly
less than zero indicate that mind-blanking is becoming relatively
more self-caught over time.
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